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International Citizenship: The Future of
Nationality in a Globalized World
KIM RUBENSTEIN AND DANIEL ADLER*
INTRODUCTION
"Precisely what the pluralization of citizenship identities and solidarities
might come to mean in concrete institutional terms ... remains unclear,"
ponders Linda Bosniak with good cause in Citizenship Denationalized. This
article attempts to identify the consequences for "nationality" in a world where
"sovereignty" is challenged by the process of globalization.2 In order to do so,
our understanding of the crucial terms is fundamental. For example, what is
nationality and what do we mean by a globalized world? Caveats necessarily
apply when using the term "future" in a title and in a thesis? Accordingly, we
seek to describe trends evident in international forums, and suggest that their
continuance, if that is the case, should prompt changes in our understanding of
the legal value of nationality to better reflect the social and political realities of
membership in a globalized world.
* Kim Rubenstein: B.A., LL.B (Hons.) (Melb.); LL.M (Harv.); Senior Lecturer in Law,
University of Melbourne. This Comment builds upon Kim Rubenstein's chapterCitizenship in a
Borderless World in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY (Anthony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., Kluwer Law International,
1998) [hereinafter LEGAL VISIONS]. Kim Rubenstein extends her appreciation to the American
Society of International Law and the Academic Council of the United Nations (ACUNS) for
inviting her to participate in their 1998 workshop at Yale, and her fellow participants whose ideas
and suggestions were invaluable in her initial work on this Comment. Daniel Adler: B.A. (Melb.);
LL.B (Hons.) (Melb.). We both thank Garry Sturgess for his insightful remarks on this Comment.
1. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 506
(2000).
2. This poses an interesting theoretical question because sovereignty has usually been
theorized in terms of the State. One result of this is that the relationship between sovereignty and
civil society is often neglected. See JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?
THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 23 (1992).
3. The ACUNS workshop participants were fortunate in being addressed by Professor Paul
Kennedy, who set out the various problems in works that predict the future. Paul Kennedy, Address
at ACUNS/ASIL Summer Workshop (Aug. 1, 1998). See also PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1994).
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In Part I of this Comment, "nationality" and "globalization" are defined.
Part II concentrates on some tensions endemic to nationality, particularly in a
globalized world. Part III follows with visions for the future.
Since ancient Athens,4 theories of citizenship have rested on the idea ofan
autonomous polity. Common membership in a political entity forms the basis
of most discussions of citizenship from Aristotle onward. In the writings of
Aristotle, Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marshall, citizenship is conceived of
in terms of political institutions which are free to act according to the will of(as
per Aristotle),5 in the interests of(as per Rousseau),6 or at least with authority
over (as per Bodin or Hobbes),7 their citizenry. Since the Enlightenment,
national sovereignty has been the theoretical basis of this freedom and its
subject-the modem State.
In its classical form, as espoused by the realist school of international
relations,8 the principle of sovereignty describes a world in which supreme
power is exercised within a particular territorial unity Sovereignty is universal,
and accordingly, the whole world is divided into these territorial units. Socially
and territorially, cohesive States are capable of making rational decisions
reflecting a national interest. These States are seen as the primary actors in
the international arena, engaging with each other on the basis of formal
equality.'° While the system operates under the assumption of equality (either
legal or moral), there are, and have always been, great power differentials
between individual States. In light of this and other criticisms, sovereignty is
more an ideal-a paradigm for the analysis and regulation of international
relations-than strictly a descriptive category." Nevertheless, reflecting the
dominant paradigm of international relations over the past three centuries, the
principle of sovereignty has had a strong normative effect. Sovereignty has
4. For a concise historical account of the origins of the different concepts of citizenship, see
DOUGLAS KLUSMEYER, BETWEEN CONSENT AND DESCENT: CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENSHIP (1996).
5. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (H. Rackman trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1959) (c. 334 B.C.).
6. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Charles Frankel trans., Hafner Pub.
Co. 1947) (1762).
7. See JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell
1955) (1577); THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642).
8. For an overview of International Relations realism, see STEPHENGILL & DAVID LAW, THE
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 25-40 (1988).
9. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 2, at 3.
10. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 65 (1990).
11. For a feminist critique of the notion of sovereignty, see Karen Knop, Re/Statements:
Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'LL. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293
(1993).
INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
greatly influenced the way we perceive our relationships with our national
communities and their interactions with each other. It has also fundamentally
informed the legal principle of nationality.
However, given the challenges to the ideal of sovereignty, the legal
principles associated with nationality need refashioning in order to better reflect
the realities of citizenship and nationality in a globalized world. Ofcourse, we
are conscious of the current tension between citizenship as a progressive
project and citizenship as a formal legal status. Thus, this Comment is
reflective of the disparities often existing between law as an ideal and law as
a pragmatic social tool.12 However, seeing legal status as part of a progressive
project, rather than as a purely formal, technical framework, law is viewed as
a tool in itself, still useful for achieving social goals, even though it is not always
successful.
1. DEFINITIONS
Central to Bosniak's article is the unraveling of the word "citizenship."
Definitions are similarly fundamental to our proposition that the legal status of
nationality will need to be reconfigured and altered in the future.
A. Citizenship and Nationality
We distinguish the terms "citizenship" and "nationality" in a technical legal
sense. While essentially the same concept, these words reflect two different
legal frameworks. Both terms identify the legal status of an individual in light
of his or her State membership. But the term "citizenship" is confined mostly
to domestic legal forums, while the term "nationality" is connected to the
international law forum. As P. Weis states, "[c]onceptually and linguistically,
the terms ...emphasize two different aspects of the same notion ...
'Nationality' stresses the international, 'citizenship' the national, municipal
aspect."' 3
While citizenship describes the technical legal relationship between the
individual and the polity, it is more than merely a descriptive category. It is a
12. David Kennedy was present at Kim Rubenstein's presentation at the ACUNS workshop in
1998 and raised various concerns with the genre of this argument. See also David Kennedy, New
Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAHL.
REv. 545 (1997).
13. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (Sijthoff &
Noordhoff2d ed. 1979) (1956).
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normative project whereby "social membership becomes increasingly
comprehensive and open ended."' 4 At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, however, there is considerable debate about the continued viability and
future direction of this project. Citizenship represents cohesion in a world
increasingly characterized by fragmentation. As such, citizenship is drawn
upon both in critique of contemporary individualism and (in some altered form)
as a possible counterpoint to it. This premise stands in contrast to an earlier,
confident, even triumphalist, discourse of citizenship as emancipation.
Though often talked about as a singular concept, the term "citizenship" is
used to describe a number of discrete but related phenomena surrounding the
relationship between the individual and the polity. 5 In Citizenship
Denationalized, Bosniak describes citizenship as four separate concepts: (1)
"citizenship as legal status;" (2) "citizenship as rights;" (3) "citizenship as
political activity;" and (4) "citizenship as a form of collective identity and
sentiment." In this Comment, we concentrate upon citizenship in two senses.
The first concentration is citizenship as a legal status 6 (the question as to
whom the State recognizes as a citizen and the formal basis for the rights and
responsibilities of the individual in the State). The second is a broader view of
citizenship as the collection of rights, duties, and opportunities for participation
that define the extent of sociopolitical membership 7 within a community. In
this description, we are combining three of Bosniak's definitions into one. Thus,
we take the theoretical liberty of synthesizing two strains of citizenship: the
liberal conception based on rights, and the republican conception based on
participation and political activity. This description is broader than legal status
because it looks to the material circumstances of life within the polity, notably
to questions of social membership and substantive equality. 8
14. BRYAN S. TURNER, CITIZENSHIP AND CAPITALISM: THE DEBATE OVER REFORMISM 135
(1986).
15. See Bosniak, supra note i, at 455; see also Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship in Australia:
Unscrambling Its Meaning, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 503 (1995).
16. Roberto Alejandro refers to this as "[clitizenship as universality and as a legal
construction" in HERMENEUTICS, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 14 (1993).
17. Alejandro refers to this as "[c]itizenship as communality and participation." Id. at 21.
18. A third view of citizenship which will not be of direct concern in this Comment is
citizenship as "desirable-activity." That is, looking at what we want citizens to be like-the "civic
virtues" concept of citizenship. See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A
Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994). Alejandro also refers
to other models: for "[c]itizenship as amelioration of class conflicts," see Alejandro, supra note
16, at 26; for "[c]itizenship as self-sufficiency," see id. at 28; and finally, for his thesis of
"[c]itizenship as a hermeneutic endeavor," see id. at 33.
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The legal rank of "citizen" in democratic societies is often intended to
represent the progressive project ofa broader conception of membership in the
community. This is achieved infrequently, 9 however, as formal equality rarely
embodies the need for substantial equality in social terms. Feminist and critical
scholarship, particularly, have highlighted the failure of gender- and race-
neutral conceptions, such as citizenship, to account for the differences of
individuals within communities. ° In Australia, for instance, legal citizenship
status has not always accorded full and equal membership rights, as the
position of the Aboriginal people illustrates. While formal legal citizens,
Indigenous Australians were denied the most basic rights of citizenship, such
as voting2l and travel. 22 Even today, some thirty years after Aboriginal people
achieved formal equality in terms of voting and travel rights, their social,
cultural, and economic positions fall short ofthat ofother Australian citizens.
This undermines the nature of their membership in the community and our
understanding of substantive citizenship. This inequality also gives rise to the
notion of second-class citizens, which Bosniak discusses in the context of
"Citizenship as Rights." 23
Citizenship, as neither gender-, class-, nor race-neutral, but rather as
affected by the position of different groups within a nation-State, has been
evident throughout the ages and continues to be so. History, however, also
relates a progression whereby our understanding of equality and membership
has been challenged and expanded over time?4 There is, then, an inherent
tension in the development of citizenship. The citizenship project is about the
19. Bosniak refers to this in Citizenship Denationalized when she discusses Charles Black and
Kenneth Karst's legal work on citizenship representing "full and equal membership." Bosniak,
supra note I, at 464.
20. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); see also
Margaret Thornton, Historicising Citizenship: Remembering Broken Promises, 20 MELB. U. L.
REv. 1072 (1996).
21. The right to vote exists in federal and state jurisdictions. In 1902, when the federal
universal franchise was introduced, it denied the vote to Aboriginal people who were not already
voting in their own states. It was not until 1962 that the federal electoral system universally
allowed Aboriginal people to vote.
22. For a fuller account of Australia's historical treatment of Aboriginal people, women, and
migrants, see JOHN CHESTERMAN & BRIAN GALLIGAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT RIGHTS: ABORIGINES
AND AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP (1997); ANN-MARI JORDENS, REDEFINING AUSTRALIANS:
IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY (1995); Ann-Mar Jordens, Redefining
'Australian Citizen' 1945-1975 (Admin., Compliance & Govemability Program Working Paper No.
8, 1993).
23. See Bosniak, supra note 1, at 463-70.
24. For a most influential account of this process, see T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND
SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1950).
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expansion of equality among citizens. However, as equality is based upon
membership, citizenship status forms the basis of an exclusive politics and
identity. At once anathema to the fulfillment ofthe citizenship project, politics
and identity have also been essential to it, providing the sense of solidarity
required for the development of modem citizenship in the nation-State."
Globalization tears further at the tension within citizenship between the
concepts of membership and equality. Globalization emphasizes different
identities of membership as the norm, according less reason to utilize a singular
notion ofcitizenship, or a single legal status linking directly to the nation-State,
as a central concept in domestic and international law. Instead of identifying
our rights and responsibilities by virtue of legal citizenship, our political, legal,
and social rights and obligations could be determined through myriad
alternative, nonnation-State frameworks.2 6  At this point, however, it is
sufficient to establish that citizenship is a status upon which legal rights and
responsibilities are often linked. For example, these rights and responsibilities
include political rights of voting and representation in democratic systems, legal
rights of mobility and travel, and social rights such as welfare. Often, in the
broader, nonlegal sense of membership of community, we include both
expressions of membership or citizenship that are not only provided to formal
citizens, such as paying taxation and other social rights and duties,27 but also
issues concerning one's self-identification-the identity of citizenship.
Interest in defining citizenship is linked to our interest in nationality and in
international law. International law affirms that each State may determine
who will be considered a citizen of that State.2" Domestic laws concerning
who is and who is not a citizen vary significantly; laws relating to citizenship
25. Anna Yeatman discusses this tension in the context of international law and human rights.
See Anna Yeatman, Who Is the Subject of Human Rights?, in CITIZENSHIP AND CULTURAL POLICY:
STATECRAFT, MARKETS AND COMMUNITY (D. Meredyth & J. Minson eds., forthcoming 2000).
Peter Spiro also has written about this tension. See Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 5 I
STAN. L. REV. 597 (1999) (reviewing ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997)).
26. For an excellent discussion of this in a domestic context, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Why
Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994).
27. For a discussion of social citizenship in the U.S. context, see Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion
and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 955 (1988); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Nora V. Demleitner, The Fallacy of Social
"Citizenship, " or the Threat of Exclusion 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (1997).
28. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 12
Apr. 1930, art. 1, 179 L.N.T.S. l0,reprinted in WEIS, supra note 13, at 259 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
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in each of the different States are also different. 29 As a result, many people
acquire more than one nationality by fulfilling the formal requirements for
citizenship in more than one domestic legal framework.
Nationality is important in international law in a variety of contexts,
including:
i. Entitlement to diplomatic protection;
ii. State responsibility to another State for failing in its duty to prevent
certain wrongful acts committed by one of its nationals
extraterritorially;
iii. State receipt of its own nationals. Paragraph 4 of article 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966
provides "No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country;"
iv. Nationality is said to import allegiance, and one of the principal
incidents of allegiance is the duty to perform military service for
the State to which allegiance is owed;
v. A State has a general right, in the absence of a specific treaty
binding it to do so, to refuse to extradite its own nationals to
another State requesting surrender;
vi. Enemy status in time of war may be determined by the nationality
of the person concerned; and
vii. States may frequently exercise criminal or otherjurisdiction on the
basis of nationality.3"
As the preliminary report on Women's Equality and Nationality in
International Law explains, "nationality secures rights for the individual by
linking her to the state.... By forging a link between individual and state,
nationality makes one state's interference with the national of another a
violation of the other state's sovereignty."'" There are also various treaties
and conventions that impact nationality.3 2 Some of the issues raised relating
29. The discussion on citizenship within the domestic sphere will be limited in this Comment
to discussions of a general nature rather than specific consequences for a range of different
legislative regimes.
30. This listing has been conveniently compiled in I.A.SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 309 (11 th ed. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
31. Preliminary Report, COMMITrEE ON FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, WOMEN'S
EQUALITY AND NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Taipei (May 6, 1998).
32. These are quite extensive, but, as cited by Nissam Bar-Yaacov and P. Weis, those
specifically dealing with nationality include: 1906 Rio de Janeiro Convention on the Status of
Naturalised Citizens; 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
2000]
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.to dual nationality, and nationality in case law, will be examined further below.
For the moment, we acknowledge nationality as a central dynamic of
international law.
B. Globalization
Just as citizenship describes a number of discrete but related phenomena
surrounding the relationship between individual and polity, so too is globalization
a term of multidimensional import.33 In using the term globalization, we are
essentially referring to the continued effect of the internationalization of the
world framework. We are not discussing a world without nation-States, but
rather one in which nation-States are fundamentally altered by the growth and
interconnection of relationships between other nation-States and individuals
around the world. This is not to say that the nation-State is obsolete or that
globalization is an entirely new phenomenon?3 However, the rapidity of the
assault upon the nation-State by the quickening turns of globalization is new,
and States have sought a range of economic and social directions by which to
steady their Statecraft. Not surprisingly, the policy choices made by modem
States have shifted with the gale-force pressure of the international political
economy. Sovereignty has necessarily been altered without being abolished.
States hold their place as key planks in the world system (though they are no
longerthe only important actors),35 but globalization has transformed and will
Nationality Laws; 1930 Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double
Nationality; 1930 Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness; 1933 Montevideo Convention on
Nationality; 1933 Montevideo Convention on Nationality of Women; 1954 Convention Relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons; 1954 Convention on Nationality Between the Members of the
Arab League; 1957 United Nations' Convention on the Nationality of Married Women; 1963
European Convention on Reduction of Cases of. Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in
Cases of Multiple Nationality; 1973 Convention for the Reduction of the Number of Cases of
Statelessness; 1977 Protocol to the European Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality; and 1977 Additional Protocol
to the European Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. NISSiM BAR-YAACOV, DUAL NATIONALITY (196 1);
WEIS, supra note 13. See also European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, Europ. T.S.
No. 166.
33. See Adelle Blackett, Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for Law School
Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 60 (1998) (arguing that the differences in the
employment of the term may be as important as the similarities); see also David Held et al.,
Globalization, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 483 (1999).
34. There was much discussion at the ACUNS 1998 workshop on whether globalization is a
"new" concept. Even if it is not new, there are contexts as discussed below within which these issues
are currently important.
35. In fact, Paul Kennedy argues that even if the autonomy and functions of the State have
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continue to revise the extent to which the State's ship is sovereign. On this
point, Manuel Castells identifies a growing "social schizophrenia," for the more
the economy becomes interdependent on a global scale, the less can regional
and local governments, as they exist today, act upon the basic mechanisms that
condition the daily existence of their citizens. The traditional structures of
social and political control overdevelopment, work, and distribution [of wealth]
have been subverted by the placeless logic ofan internationalised economy.3 6
Additionally, regional economies and markets have altered the ideal of
sovereignty by promoting the free movement of goods and labor across nation-
State borders. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the Asia Pacific
Economic Community are examples ofthis trend. Isolationist views of single
States, about any matter, wilt under the pressure of these new frameworks.
As Paul Kennedy argues, "globalisation threatens to undermine the assumed
integrity of the nation-state as the central organizing unit of domestic and
external affairs."37
Related to trade, yet also distinct, is the development of global institutions
with authority beyond single governments. These institutions include
organizations established to manage the machinery oftransnational activities?'
Financial markets are one example where the massive ebb and flow of
international capital is beyond the control of nation-States, however constituted.
A contrasting example is the World Trade Organization (WTO), which again
evidences global institutional development. Furthermore, procedures to resolve
disputes between countries, if we take the WTO as a case in point, are more
legalistic and therefore more binding over the participating nation-States.39
Thus, since global regimes and institutions can regulate matters beyond the
control of any single government, national sovereignty is inevitably undermined
as a consequence.
been eroded by transnational trends, no adequate substitute has emerged to replace it as the key unit
in responding to global change. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 134. See also Paul Hirst &
Grahame Thompson, Globalization and the Future of the Nation State, 24 ECON. & SOC'y 408
(1995).
36. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATIONAL CITY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING, AND THE URBAN-REGIONAL PRocEss 347 (1989).
37. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 53.
38. David Held discusses this as the disjuncture of international organizations. See David Held,
Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System, 20 ECON. & SOC'Y 138, 152 (1991).
39. See Kim Rubenstein & Jenny Schultz, Bringing Law and Order to International Trade:
Administrative Law Principles and the GATT/WTO, 11 ST.JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 271 (1996).
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Supranational institutions like the United Nations General Assembly and
Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and the European Court
of Justice, to name but a few, are additions to this picture. These bodies are
responsible for issues that arise where borders and national laws are less
relevant, and where "universal principles"4 are called upon to determine
disputes within the international community. The whole development of
international law and, more particularly, ofa human rights framework, provide
for global accountability of a new order. The human rights framework deals
with citizens within nation-States and undermines older notions of sovereignty
articulated in international law, whereby matters within a country were solely
for its own determination. The human rights framework highlights that the
State can no longer be protected from scrutiny in how it treats individuals
within its territory.4 The human rights aspect of globalization is further
developed in Part II, where we argue that the law of nationality is being
transformed and forced to keep apace with the realities of this framework.
In addition to these developments, there is growing recognition that many
issues of policy for individual States are not the sole concern of the nation-
State, but of the global order as well. This recognition dates back to the
beginning of the nation-State; postal reciprocity, international travel, and
communication were, and will continue to be, affected by this reality.
Environmental and nuclear problems represent pressing current concerns.
Single nation-State action will not be sufficient to deal with global disorder in
these areas. The "interconnectedness of global changes [is] now affecting our
whole planet."42 Many writers talk about this phenomenon as an expression
ofa global civil society. Adding to the work ofnon-govemmental organizations
and other non-State-based organizations, are expressions of politics beyond the
40. There is a valuable debate over the terminology of universal human rights. See generally
Abdullahi An-Naim, What Do We Mean by Universal?, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 120 (1994);
Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of
Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 740 (1994); Nancy Kim,
Towards a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism
and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1993); Samuel K. Murumba, Cross-
Cultural Dimensions of Human Rights, in LEGAL VISIONS, supra note *, at 207.
41. See Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision: An International
Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed', 1997); see also Berta Esperanza Hernndez-
Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075. These articles argue that legislative proposals such as the California
Proposition 187 are contrary to the international human rights framework and as such could be
fought against and potentially invalidated.
42. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 114.
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nation-State, as identified by Paul Wapner in his work on environmental
activism on the world civic stage.43
Finally, the continued growth and reliance on information technology has
made knowledge accessible well beyond individual State borders. Electronic
mail, the World Wide Web, the Internet in its other guises, corporate intranets,
and other forms of data flow all promote discussion and knowledge.
International collaboration on research and other projects is thereby facilitated.
Libraries across the world are opened at the beck and call of individuals
tapping away at their desks. Thus, we have moved well beyond the
dissemination of knowledge through television networks and wire services that
had previously contributed to our knowledge of issues and events outside
domestic borders.
This dissemination of knowledge has meant that the concept of
globalization includes "the compression of the world and ... the intensification
of the consciousness of the world as a whole. 44 People are directly affected
by these changes to be sure, but there is also a keen consciousness of other
changes that are swirling about us, almost ready to prick our skin. As
Jonathan Friedman argues, the essence of globalization "resides in the
consciousness of the global, that is consciousness by individuals of the global
situation, specifically that the world is an arena in which we all participate."45
The concepts discussed in this definition of globalization relate to the
discussion in Part I of Bosniak's Citizenship Denationalized,
"Denationalization in Fact." Our discussion has a slightly different emphasis.
Rather than trying to denationalize citizenship, we have discussed the trends
away from a State-centered notion, in order to consider the impact of
citizenship on the legal status of nationality.46 Ultimately, however, our
discussion draws conclusions that are similar to Bosniak's.
43. Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics,
47 WORLD POL. 311 (1995).
44. J. FRIEDMAN, CULTURAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL PROCESS 196 (1994) (quoting R.
ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992)). Note, however,
the persuasive comments of Kennedy, that while the global economy is becoming more integrated
and richer overall, the wealth is uneven. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 49.
45. FRIEDMAN, supra note 44, at 196.
46. Bosniak, supra note 1, at 453-89.
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II. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON NATIONALITY
What does this all mean for the legal term "nationality ?" This part of the
Comment looks at nationality in law and analyzes how globalization is affecting
its functionality as a legal and social tool. Is it as useful a legal concept if its
operational framework is subject to significant change? And, if the nation-
State is so wrought by a changing global environment, what is the impact on
our legal understanding of nationality?
In looking at the impact ofglobalization upon the international legal notion
of nationality, we briefly trace its development through the era preceding the
current impact of globalization. From a historical perspective, nationality is
linked to the bond of allegiance between the individual and the State.4"
Traditionally, this bond has been viewed as insoluble or at least exclusive. It
dates from the European State system in the Middle Ages when the
relationship between individual and State was derived from the inherent and
permanent bond between subject and sovereign. 8 The common law
recognized this bond and expressed it in the doctrine nemo potest exuere
patriam-no man may abjure his country. According to Sir William
Blackstone, an individual's obligations to the sovereign represented "a debt of
gratitude[] which cannot be forfeited, cancelled or altered by any change of
time, place or circumstance."49 Similarly, Sir Matthew Hale, writing on the
problems of dual allegiance in 1730, stated:
[H]ence it is, that the natural-born subject of one prince
cannot by swearing allegiance to another prince put off or
discharge him from natural allegiance; for this natural
allegiance was intrinsic and primitive, and antecedent to the
other, and cannot be devested without the concurrent act of
that prince to whom it was first due.5"
47. For a comprehensive historical study of dual nationality and its legal consequences, see
Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1412 (1997).
Although this article is written from a North American perspective, it contains much useful material
on the history of nationality law in the international context.
48. See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 614, 629 (K.B. 1608),cited in Spiro, supra note 47,
at 1420.
49. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (1884); see
also Spiro, supra note 47 at 1420 (discussing Blackstone's commentaries).
50. SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 68 (1736).
530
INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
While the concept of insoluble allegiance was defensible in times of limited
individual mobility, it became difficult to maintain in the face of large-scale
international migration. Nonetheless, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, characterized by aggressive nationalism and territorial competition
between States, the concept of dual nationality was generally seen as
undesirable, incompatible with individual loyalties, and destabilizing of the
international order. Accordingly, insoluble allegiance was gradually replaced
by exclusive, but transmutable, allegiance as the basis of nationality.
Just as the doctrine of insoluble allegiance is a product of medieval Europe,
the development of exclusive allegiance as the basis for nationality reflects the
state of international relations in the second half of the nineteenth century.
This was the high water mark of classical international relations and of State
sovereignty as the organizing principle of international relations. In this
context, dual nationality was an intolerable affront to the absolute authority of
the State with regard to its territory and its nationals." Peter Spiro captures
it this way:
Dual nationals represented on the one hand a constant source
of international tension where one state attempted to protect
its citizen from mistreatment at the hands of another state
claiming the same individual as its own. On the other hand,
the presumptively divided loyalties of dual nationals
represented a potential threat from within the polity in times
of international conflict.2
In the absence of an international accord on the grant and transfer of
nationality, the international system developed a number ofdevices to prevent
or counteract the common causes of dual nationality. These were as follows:
(a) In cases of dual nationality acquired by naturalization it became
common for the predecessor State to expatriate an individual who
took up citizenship of a foreign State.53 The requirement for this
expatriation is clearly related to the exclusivity of allegiance. 4
51. Expressions of the undesirability of dual nationality abound in the U.S. from the 1850s to
the 1950s. See Spiro, supra note 47, at 1430 n.83. "[Diouble allegiance in the sense of double
nationality has no place in our law." Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 729 (1898) (Fuller, J.)
52. Spiro, supra note 47, at 1414.
53. See, e.g., Naturalisation Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. 168, ch. 14, § 6 (Eng.). This can also
be seen in the current Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, § 17 (Austl.).
54. Cf U.S. Secretary of State Cass on the subject ("The moment a foreigner becomes
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(b) Where by birthright a child would obtain dual nationality by a
combination of the operation ofjus soli on the one hand andjus
sanguinis on the other, the favored approach was to prevent the
eventuality of dual nationality by the enforcement of an election
upon majority. Thus, for example, the Nationality & Status of
Aliens Act of 1914 (UK)5" provided that subjects born abroad
would lose their entitlement to British nationality by way ofjus
sanguinis if they did not make a declaration of retention of British
nationality together with a declaration of divestment of any other
nationality within one year of attaining the age of twenty-one.5 6
In other countries, such as the United States, no formal election was
required, but the doctrine ofexclusivity was maintained in that expatriation was
implied where, in the totality ofthe circumstances, "the individual showed more
attachment to the other country than to the US."57
Throughout the first halfof the twentieth century and well into the 1960s,
there continued to be "a widely held opinion that dual nationality [was] an
undesirable phenomenon detrimental to both the friendly relations between
nations and the well-being of the individuals concerned."58 Not surprisingly
then, this period saw a number of attempts to root out the occurrence of dual
nationality by means of multilateral codification of the law on the subject.
Among these are the Harvard Research Draft (1929),' 9 The Hague
Convention (1930),6 The Report of the ILC on Multiple Nationality
(1954),61 and The European Convention on the Reduction of Cases of
Multiple Nationality (1963),62 each ofwhich shared the premise that multiple
national allegiances were undesirable and to be eradicated where possible.
One example of this, The Hague Convention, provided in its preamble that
naturalized his allegiance to his native country is severed forever-He experiences a new political
birth.") J. B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 574 (1906).
55. See British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 17, § I (Eng.).
56. For a list of other national laws requiring election, see Note, Draft of Convention on
Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 23 (1929) [hereinafter Harvard Research Draft].
57. Spiro, supra note 47, at 1440. Note that this formulation closely resembles the nationality
test set out in the Nottebohn case discussed below.
58. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 32, at 4.
59. Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, The Law of Nationality, 23 AM.
J. INT'L L. 28 (Suppl. 29); Harvard Research Draft, supra note 56.
60. Hague Convention, supra note 28.
61. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on Multiple
Nationality, International Law Commission, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/83 (1954), I.L.C. at 6.
62. Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations
in Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, supra note 32.
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"it is in the general interest of the international community to secure that all its
members should recognize that every person should have a nationality and
should have one nationality."63
Drawing on this historical outline, two important points are crucial to the
development of our argument. First, the development in international law of
nationality has moved from more rigid to more flexible forms. Second, this
development has occurred in response to the changing structure of the
international political economy. Nationality, therefore, can continue its
development to better reflect the current political framework within which it
operates, a framework in which the nation-State no longer dominates. It is
our contention, developed further in Part IlI, thatthe principles against dual or
multiple nationality are no longer valid in the current framework and that
multiple citizenships are in fact the norm and will be embraced in the future.
As discussed, the importance of nationality arises variously in international
law linked to the centrality of States to the international law machinery. Ifthe
State's value decreases in international governance,'M so too will the value of
nationality. Looking specifically at the development of international law
principles within the current system, there are tensions that need addressing.
This section looks at some of those principles through decisions of the
International Court of Justice, the European Human Rights Court, the United
Nation's Compensation Commission, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and the
Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The emergence of this later Committee in itself reflects
changes that are altering the nature of nationality in a globalized world.
A. International Case Law
Case law is necessarily restricted tojusticiable disputes in a given field.
While an instructive approach, it is acknowledged that justiciable disputes
represent but a small and often possibly unrepresentative cross-section of
practice in a given area. This is particularly true of nationality in international
law. Based as it is on the assumption of sovereignty, it is loath to limit the
power of the State to determine under its own law who are its nationals.65
Accordingly, instances in which supranational tribunals have cause to comment
on issues of nationality are limited.
63. Hague Convention, supra note 28.
64. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 548-50 n.4 (reviewing notions of governance).
65. Hague Convention, supra note 28, arts. 1-3.
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Our review of international case law on nationality discloses two broad
categories of cases: (1) standing cases, and (2) human rights cases. The
standing cases require international arbitration because they involve a conflict
between two States over the nationality of an individual. We identify these as
standing cases because the question at issue is whether a particular State has
standing to represent an individual in an action vis-ji-vis another State. The
principle of State sovereignty underlies these cases and can be expressed as
follows: what a State does to one of its own nationals is not a matter for
international law, whereas what a State does to a national of another State can
be the subject of international law ifthe State to which the individual belongs
takes issue on behalf of the citizen.66 This principle itself is open to question
within a globalized world.
1. Standing Cases
The leading case on the question of nationality for the purpose of
diplomatic protection is Nottebohm.67 It concerned a German national who
lived and conducted business in Guatemala for most of his adult life. Shortly
after the outbreak of war in 1939, Nottebohm made moves to acquire
Liechtenstein nationality and was granted it in October of that year. After the
grant, Nottebohm stayed in Liechtenstein for some seven years before
returning to Guatemala, this time on Liechtenstein papers. Despite having
acquired Liechtenstein nationality, Nottebohm was declared an enemy alien in
Guatemala, was deported, and his property confiscated. In response,
Liechtenstein sought to seize the court, asserting an alleged breach of
international law in relation to its national, Nottebohm.
At the hearing, the preliminary question was whether Nottebohm's
Liechtenstein nationality was effective at international law vis-6-vis
Guatemala. In finding that it was not, the International Court of Justice held
that "nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,
a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties."68 While municipal law regarding
citizenship is binding within a State, it need only be recognized in the
international arena when "the legal bond of nationality accord(s) with the
66. WEIS, supra note 13, at 35.
67. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
68. Id. at 23.
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individual's genuine connection with the state which assumes the defence of
its citizens by means of protection against other states. 69
The preference for social connections over legal formalities could be read
to allow the recognition at international law of a number of effective
nationalities. This, however, does not appear to be the intent of the Court in
Nottebohm. The International Court of Justice's concept of effective
nationality is grounded in the concept of allegiance and a reluctance to
recognize nationality without allegiance. Thus, the majority opinion states that
naturalization involves "[the] breaking of a bond of allegiance and [the]
establishment of a new bond of allegiance."7 Similarly, the possibility of
effective dual nationality is far from countenanced in the statement "the
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred
. . . is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State
conferring nationality than with that of any other State."'" Based on
notions of national allegiance, this test has difficulty recognizing multiple
nationality for the purposes of public international law. Itsjustification is the
apparent inequity of allowing an individual diplomatic protection against that
individual's own State under cover of a second nationality, where that action
would not be available to fellow citizens with a single nationality. As a result,
multiple nationality is the exception rather than the rule. Historically, this was
indeed the case. In a world where links to more than one nation are
increasingly common, however, an alternative to so restricting the cause of
action is to expand it, allowing States to intervene on behalf ofanyone who
has a significant link to that country, be it by birth, blood, or later association.
Another alternative is to allow individuals and other non-State entities greater
access to international legal systems. While both of these suggestions
undermine the principle, making international law mute on the way a State
treats its own nationals, this expression of unfettered sovereignty has already
lost much of its force through the development of international human rights
law in the second half of the twentieth century.
Cases decided since Nottebohm evidence some movement in this
direction. They include cases before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the
UN Compensation Commission-Claims Against Iraq, and various cases based
on human rights, each of which are discussed in the following sections.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 24.
7 I. ld. at 23 (emphasis added).
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a. Iran-US. Claims Tribunal2
One of the functions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was to determine
claims under the Claims Settlement Declaration of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria (Declaration). 3 Article II of the Declaration
states the Tribunal was established "for the purpose of deciding claims of
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran
against the United States."'74 In its deliberations, the Tribunal considered the
claims of some applicants who were both Iranian citizens under Iranian law
and U.S. citizens under U.S. law.
The Tribunal found it had "jurisdiction over claims against Iran by dual
Iran-United States nationals when the dominant and effective nationality ofthe
claimant during the relevant period ... was that of the United States."75 In so
finding, the Tribunal rejected an argument based on the Hague Convention and
older customary law that diplomatic protection is excluded in the case of dual
nationality.76 Its reasons were twofold:
(a) as individuals had standing before the tribunal, the questions arising
did not replicate those involving the right of States to represent
individuals at public international law;77 and
(b) even with regard to cases such asNottebohm involving diplomatic
protection in the stricter sense, the law has developed from the
codification in The Hague Convention (Article 4) that "[a] State
may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against
a State whose nationality such a person also possesses."78
Thus, the current law allows claims ofdual nationals where their dominant and
effective nationality is not that ofthe respondent State. This rationale is based
on the Nottebohm principle that nationality is ajuridical translation of social
fact.79
72. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Decision in Case No. A/I8 Concerning the Question of
Jurisdiction over Claims of Persons With Dual Nationality, Apr. 6, 1984, 5 IRAN-U.S.CLAIMs TRIB.
REPORTS 251 [hereinafter Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal].
73. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and political Republic of Algeria
concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 230 [hereinafter Declaration].
74. Declaration, supra note 73.
75. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, supra note 72, at 253.
76. Id. at 262-63.
77. Id. at 261.
78. Id. at 260.
79. Id. at 263.
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Two further comments in the majority judgment advance our argument:
(a) the Tribunal's statement that the move toward the recognition of
effective over formal nationality is consistent with "the
contemporaneous development of international law to accord legal
protections to individuals, even against the State of which they are
nationals;""0 and
(b) the final sentence of thejudgment stating that in cases where "the
tribunal finds jurisdiction based upon a dominant and effective
nationality... the other nationality may remain relevant to the
merits of the claim."8'
Though the majority opinion maintains the notion that an individual must
have a dominant and effective nationality, the two quotes in the preceding
paragraph indicate a broadening of the Nottebohm notion of one nationality
based on allegiance.
This position is developed in the concurring opinions ofMembers Holzman,
Aldrich, and Mosk, 2 who would allow claims by all nationals of the United
States and Iran, regardless of whether they held dual nationality.
b. UN Compensation Commission-Claims Against Iraq8 3
A more radical position came from the UN Compensation Commission
(Commission) when it assessed individual claims against Iraq following the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While not a court, the Commission did have
a quasi-judicial function. Its chief purpose was to process claims against Iraq
arising from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait and to make payments
from the Compensation Fund.
When confronted with Iraqi dual nationals making claims against the Fund,
the Commission dealt with the question in an administrative fashion. It
developed a strategy for determining claims in an expedited manner. The
application ofthe dominant and effective nationality test was incompatible with
the speedy administration of the Fund."4 As a result, there were no inquiries
80. Jd. at 265.
81. Id. at 265-66.
82. Id. at 267-73.
83. Claims Against Iraq (Category "A" Claims), 109 I.L.R. 2 (U.N. Compensation Commission
1994).
84. Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Sixth
Installment of Claims for Departure from Iraq or Kuwait (Category "A" Claims), U.N. SCOR
Compensation Commission Governing Council, 51st Sess., 1 29, U.N. Doc. S/AC.261l996/3 (1996).
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made into the factual attachments and connections of dual national applicants.
Instead, a test of bonafides was applied. Thus, Iraqi dual nationals were
entitled to have their applications considered as long as they were not seen to
have acquired their second nationality mainly or solely for the purpose of
claiming compensation.85 As there were no claims from Iraqi dual nationals
who had applied for a second nationality after establishment of the eligibility
criteria for compensation, the Commission did not deny any claims from dual
nationals on the basis of the acquisition of a second nationalitymalafides.86
Each of these standing cases shows a move away from traditional
approaches to dual nationality. UnlikeNottebohm, where allegiance was the
central factor in nationality determination, effective nationality is considered
more in the broader sense of social fact. This concept is highlighted further in
the human rights cases.
2. Human Rights Cases
Whereas the standing cases present nationality as a preliminary issue, the
human rights cases consider the rights of citizenship or nationality in a
substantive sense. They are justiciable because of international instruments
that stand with State sovereignty as the basis of international law. By and
large, the cases evolve where human rights law is called upon to imbue an
individual with certain rights of membership though citizenship is formally
lacking (e.g., where individuals have the right to reside in a certain country).
There are also other human rights cases where human rights law is called upon
by individuals seeking to escape undesirable consequences of unwanted
nationality.87 Finally, there are other international law cases not centered upon
human rights as such, where the nationality issues raised in Nottebohm88
arise. For present purposes, we concentrate on human rights cases where an
85. Id. 29-31.
86. Id. 31.
87. See, e.g., Case 37/74, Van den Broeck v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 235 (where nationality
was imposed by law on a female official upon her marriage and was disregarded by the Court in
determining a fight to an expatriation allowance); Case 257/78, Devred, nde Kenny-Levick, v.
Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 3767 (also dealing with expatriation allowance and holding that the
concept of "nationality" should be interpreted so as to avoid any unwarranted difference in
treatment between male and female officials).
88. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). One example
concerns fishing rights. See Case C-280/89, Re British Fishing Boats: Commission (Spain
Intervening) v. Ireland [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 273 (1992) (regarding the nationality of vessels). In this
Comment we do not go into great detail in the area of maritime law.
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individual seeks the protection of principles associated with nationality, when
nationality is lacking.
a. Bejoudi v. France"
In 1950, Mohand Beljoudi was born in France to Algerian parents. He
lived in France from birth and was unacquainted with either the Islamic religion
or Arabic, the language of Algeria. He went to school in France and married
a French woman in 1970. Nevertheless, Beldjoudi did not attain French
citizenship because he did not comply with the relevant statutory procedure for
converting his "special civil status" to full citizenship.
On the basis of a history of criminal convictions resulting in a number of
terms of imprisonment, the relevant Minister issued a deportation order. The
case cited is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights with regard
to Beldjoudi's deportation.
While not decided on grounds of nationality," the logic of effective
nationality underwrites the majority opinion and the concurringj udgments in
their finding that the decision to deport Beldjoudi, if implemented, would be in
breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Article 8 of the Convention provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.9'
In interpreting this Section, the majority explains that the expulsion of a
person from the country in which his or her immediate family resides will give
89. Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1992).
90. It is noted by the majority that the Convention does not in principle prohibit the
Contracting States from regulating the entry and length of stay of aliens. id. at 41.
91. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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rise to a contravention of "the right to respect for family life afforded by
Article 8" if it is notjustified when weighed against what may be regarded as
necessary and thus allowable pursuant to Article 8(2).92 In order for an action
to be within the bounds of the Convention, "the interference [must]
correspond[] to a pressing social need and, in particular, [one] that it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.""a
Though citizenship is not the issue, the Court's discussion of the level of
the interference caused by deporting the applicant engages the discourse of
effective nationality. In the end, the applicant's deportation is severely
disruptive of his private and family life for the very reason that his social and
familial networks are thoroughly entrenched in the French State. The applicant
has the fullest effective nationality, in theNottebohm sense, where nationality
is expressed as "having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments together with the existence
of reciprocal rights and duties."'94 In such situations, the majority found that
deportation isjustifiably proportionate only in "exceptional circumstances.' 5
Though the applicant was convicted of various crimes and made eligible for
deportation under the relevant statute, the disruption to the applicant's family
life made deportation unjustified from a public policy standpoint.
The logical extension of the effective nationality principle is explored in the
concurring opinion of Judge Martens. Ifeffective nationality represents a shift
from nationality based on formal admission to a State to nationality
acknowledged on the social facts of an individual's participation in the life of
a community, it is arguable that any distinction between formal citizens and
fully effective citizens is artificial. Or as Martens frames it in his analysis of
Beldjoudi's case: "In my opinion, mere nationality does not constitute an
objective and reasonable justification for the existence of a difference as
regards the admissibility of expelling someone from what, in both cases, may
be called his own country.""6 Here, we see a fluid approach to the place of
nationality in international law.
92. Beldjoudi v. France, supra note 89, at 41.
93. Id. at 43.
94. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.I. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
95. Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 44 (1992).
96. Id. at 37 (Martens, J., concurring).
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b. Stewart v. Canada9 7
The Human Rights Committee (Committee) under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights illustrates the definition ofglobalization
as argued in this piece. It is a decision-making body in an international law
context that determines disputes brought to it from individuals in countries that
have signed the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. While the Committee lacks determinative powers, and thus
does not destroy notions of sovereignty, its political might and existence
weakens the nation-State's total control over human rights matters within its
jurisdiction. In Stewart v. Canada, Charles Edward Stewart was a British
citizen born in 1960 who, from the age of seven, had lived in Ontario, Canada,
with his family. Though Stewart considered himself to be a Canadian citizen
for most of his life, he was never naturalized and as such never achieved that
status.
Between 1978 and 1991, he was convicted of some forty-two criminal
offenses, the last of which triggered a move by the Canadian government to
deport him to the United Kingdom in accordance with the Canadian
Immigration Act. As a result, he complained of violations of various articles
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The determinative article was Article 12(4), which provides: "No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country." Thus, the
Committee considered two questions of mixed law and fact: (a) was Canada
the applicant's own country; and if so, (b) was the applicant being arbitrarily
deprived of his right to enter Canada? The Committee answered both of these
questions in the negative. It held that the words "own country" used in Article
12(4) ofthe Covenant are broader than the concept "country of his nationality"
and are applied to individuals who, though not nationals in a formal sense, are
also not "aliens" within the meaning of Article 13.98 In arriving at this view,
the Committee was influenced by Article 13 of the Covenant which speaks of
"an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party" when discussing the rights
of State parties to expel these persons. The Committee then commented that
it is less clear
97. Stewart v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58D/538/1993, in 4 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 418
(1997).
98. Jd. 12.3.
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who, in addition to nationals, is protected by the provisions of
article 12, paragraph 4. Since the concept "his own country"
is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality
acquired on birth or by conferral, it embraces, at the very
least, an individual who, because of his special ties to or
claims in relation to a given country cannot there be
considered to be a mere alien.99
In considering the category of people described in the preceding
paragraph, the Committee saw it as including: "nationals of a country who
have there been stripped of their nationality in violation of intemational law and
of individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or
transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied
them."00
As Canada placed no unreasonable impediments on the applicant from
acquiring formal nationality, the Committee held that Canada was not the
applicant's "own country" for the purposes of Article 12(4). However, the
Committee was not prepared to find that the words "his own country"
extended to individuals who had either chosen not to acquire the nationality of
their home country or committed criminal acts which prevent them from doing
SO.
This reasoning is based on a "rights and obligations" view of citizenship.
In the opinion of the Committee:
Countries like Canada, which enable immigrants to become
nationals after a reasonable period of residence, have a right
to expect that such immigrants will in due course acquire all
the rights and assume all the obligations that nationality
entails. Individuals who do not take advantage of this
opportunity and thus escape the obligations nationality
imposes can be deemed to have opted to remain aliens in
Canada. They have the right to do so, but must bear the
consequences.'0 '
99. Jd. 12.4.
100. Id.
101. Id. 12.8.
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A dissenting opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Cecilia Medina Ouroga, and
supported by an additional four members of the Committee, offers a more
liberal interpretation. Evatt and Ouroga criticize the majority for failing to
recognize that the protection offered by Article 12(4) exists "because it is
deemed unacceptable to deprive any person of close contact with his family
or his friends or . . .the web of relationships that form his or her social
environment."' l Considering Stewart's family ties, his long standing residence
in Canada, and desire to remain in Canada, the dissenters found that Canada
was his "own country" and that he was entitled to protection from deportation.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Prafullachandra Bhagwati took the argument
a step further by allowing that an individual may have more than one country
as his "own" within the meaning of Article 12(4).103
The decision dilutes nationality as a legal tool for resolving international law
dilemmas involving a person's connection to the nation-State. In fact, the
dissenters are more consistent in interpreting nationality as a progressive
project concerned with the broader indicia determining a person's attachment
to a community and identifying that person as a member.
Both the standing and human rights cases display tensions in the
functionality of the formal status of nationality in international law. If law is
to be an effective tool for the resolution of international matters, then it needs
to be refashioned in the future.
III. EFFECTIVE NATIONALITY AS THE FUTURE
The arguments raised in Bosniak's Citizenship Denationalized over
whether postnational forms are properly described in terms of citizenship are
somewhat circular. Statist theorists argue that citizenship necessarily entails
membership of a bounded political community with a shared public culture, a
requirement placing citizenship firmly in the nation-State. In opposition,
Cosmopolitan thinkers prefer focusing on citizenship as political activity and
allow for its existence outside the nation-State.
At one level, this is little more than a definitional argument. As illustrated
above, and as Bosniak clearly outlines, citizenship is both a contested and a
fluid concept-remarkable for its ability to retain relevance for more than 2000
years. As a result, citizenship is not subject to a concise or agreed upon
definition. Within the broad discourse of the jurisprudence, sociology, and
102. Id. C-5.
103. Id. C-6.
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politics of membership, citizenship ambulates to the point where it is what we
define it as being. Thus, in any descriptive sense, the importance of the
definitional argument is defunct; except, of course, inasmuch as it weighs on
the future of the citizenship project. In this normative sense, the discussion is
of fundamental importance as it poses the question: "How do we proceed in
the struggle for equality of membership and participation in political life?"
In Bosniak's words, the denationalization of citizenship is an
"aspiration."' It is important because citizenship has an "enormous
legitimizing function. To characterize a set of social practices in the language
of citizenship is to honor them with recognition as politically and socially
consequential-as centrally constitutive and defining of our collective lives. To
refuse them the designation [as citizenship values] is, correspondingly, to deny
them such recognition."'0 5 Thus, the question is not: Can citizenship have
postnational forms? It clearly can depending on how we define the term.
Rather, the question is: Is it desirable that relations and affiliations outside
traditional national citizenship are canvassed?
The strongest arguments against the radical pluralization of citizenship
come from liberal nationalists. These scholars'06 see national identity as
doubly threatened. It is threatened from below by "fragmentation in the form
of divisive multiculturalist politics in liberal democratic states, and
fundamentalist ethnocultural rivalries elsewhere."'0 7 It is threatened from
above by accelerated globalization that reifies the values of the market and
weakens the individual's bond with his or her community of origin.
The above forces are said to undermine the operation of liberal democratic
communities. While pluralist communities should be acknowledged, national
identities need to remain primary as liberalism depends on the sense of
"common good" or "shared fate" that they, and only they, engender., 8
Absent "institutional arrangements at the transnational level that can command
the solidarity and deploy the resources and authority necessary to ensure their
achievement,"'1 9 distributive justice and equality of treatment are likely to
104. See Bosniak, supra note 1, at 489.
105. Id. at 489-90.
106. See, e.g.; DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995); YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM
(1993).
107. See Bosniak, supra note 1, at 498.
108. Id. at 499-500 (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 499.
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remain national projects, "justified on the basis that members of a community
must protect one another and guarantee one another equal respect.", " 0
Bosniak objects to the liberal national position on a number of grounds.
First, it necessitates a continued "privileging" of the national on the basis that
it automatically excludes nonnational others from "the domain of normative
concern.""' Second, the reality of global relations means that national
protectionist or isolationist policies will often be counterproductive to
progressive outcomes."2 Third, nationalist aspirations may encourage national
over class solidarity." 3 Finally, Bosniak contends a national focus may be
counterproductive to democratic ideals in a world where the power to address
"many of today's most pressing problems" lies outside the practical limits of
the nation-State's power) " 4
Thus, Bosniak rejects liberal nationalism in favor of some form of plural
citizenship. Based on the arguments outlined above,' she advocates less the
demise of national citizenship, as "the decentering or 'demoting' [of] the
nation" in order to facilitate "an aspiration toward a multiple [and] pluralized
understanding of citizenship identity and citizen solidarity.""' 6
To the extent that Bosniak looks beyond the bourds of the nation-State
when addressing the future of citizenship, her argument is strong. What her
argument openly omits, however, is what consequences this will have in
practical terms. This Comment has argued that one significant consequence
is the altering of the legal principles of nationality." 7 In concrete terms, we
predict a future that includes the following:
(1) an increasing willingness in international treaty law to
acknowledge and encourage dual and multiple nationality;
(2) a dilution of the centrality of allegiance and the consequences
of nationality in domestic and international case law;
110. Id. (quoting MILLER, supra note 106, at 187).
Ill. See Bosniak, supra note i, at 501.
112. Id. at 504.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Namely that there is an increasing trend for people to locate their fundamental political
affinities and actions with "a variety of communities that are neither defined nor circumscribed by
nation-state boundaries." Id. at 505.
116. Id. at 506.
117. Kim Rubenstein has suggested some consequences in the domestic context for citizenship
in Citizenship in a Borderless World, in LEGAL VISIONS, supra note *, at 183. Gary Sturgess has
also suggested some practical consequences in Citizen, Customer, Community: Changing Attitudes
to Political Membership in INDIVIDUAL, COMMUNITY NATION: 50 YEARS OF AUSTRALIAN
CITIZENSHIP (Kim Rubenstein, ed., Australian Scholarly Publishing, forthcoming 2000).
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(3) a movement away from the centrality of the State in international
law.
All the Conventions against multiple nationality are premised upon
resolution of conflict and the difficulties arising from multiple nationality. In
our view, due to the developments described in this Comment as globalization,
multiple nationality will become the norm in international law. This trend can
already be seen in the 1997 European Convention on Nationality"' which
includes a chapter on "Multiple Nationality" and allows the retention of multiple
nationality in certain circumstances." 9 As Bosniak argues, this is not
necessarily the demise of the nation-State or citizenship denationalized, but
rather citizenship multinationalized. In this situation, notions of effective
nationality will become even more important in the resolution of conflicts.
Thus, we contend that effective nationality takes into account a much broader
notion of citizenship. It is not concerned with the formal legal status of an
individual, nor solely concerned with allegiance, but with issues of social fact,
identity, and justice in a given situation.
The concept of effective nationality facilitates a theoretical (if not yet a
practical) entry point for the acknowledgment of layered and/or fragmented
nationality appropriate to the circumstances of our participation in a given
national, supranational, regional, or even nonterritorial communities. Surely,
such a diversity of participation will produce conundrums in terms of conflicts
and priorities of interest. But in a theoretical framework that "privileges" a
fluidity of networks over a static allegiance, our legal concept of citizenship and
nationality must have the flexibility to accommodate the struggle for
membership and participation in the polity which has defined the citizenship
project since the development of civil rights in eighteenth-century Britain. In
tracing the development of principles of nationality in international law, we
have highlighted the centrality of allegiance in Nottebohm.2 ° The case law
since has broadened the concept of effective nationality, concentrating less on
sole nationality and allowing consideration of other matters. This broadening
of approach to issues of nationality will no doubt continue. While not totally
denationalizing nationality, as there is still some interest in the relationship
between the individual and the State, formal links to the State are but one
118. See European Convention on Nationality, opened for signature Nov. 6, 1997, Eur. T.S.
No. 166. The Convention has institutionalized and recognized as a fact of international life the
concept of multiple nationality. See also Ryszard Pitorowicz, One Nation or Two? New
Developments in Citizenship Law, 72 Ausm. L.J. 673 (1999).
119. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 118, arts. 14-17.
120. See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
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factor under consideration. This also picks up on Bosniak's discussion of
citizenship as identity. 2 ' The theoretical notions of effective nationality are
concerned with a person's connections in fact-their social, political, and
psychological connections. Accepting this, one would think current restrictions
confining causes of action in international law to State nationals should be lifted
to allow States to intervene on behalf ofanyone who has a significant link to
that country, be it by birth, blood, or later association.
Another alternative is to allow individuals and other non-State entities
greater access to internationaijustice. To do so denationalizes citizenship still
further in certain circumstances. Identities previously unseen by international
law are suddenly recognized through their attachment to non-State players.
For instance, membership of a non-governmental organization or a religious
body could be recognized in international law as granting standing. The
acceptance ofthis will open the face ofcitizenship to incorporate multifaceted
connections well beyond the nation-State.
While both ofthese suggestions undermine international law saying nothing
about the way a State treats its own nationals, the expression of unfettered
sovereignty has already lost much of its weight through the development of
international human rights law in the second half of the twentieth century.
Where does this leave the principles outlined in our definitions of
nationality, such as the entitlement to diplomatic protection and a State's
general right in the absence of a treaty to refuse to extradite its own nationals
to another State requesting surrender? Our argument on multiple nationalities
extends to all of these principles. Effective nationality should be the stronger
consideration rather than formal nationality. It is not based simply on
allegiance, as inNottebohm, but on the social, psychological, and cultural facts
relevant to the situation.
All of these changes represent the continued growth of citizenship as a
flexible concept. Its fluidity and flexibility is its great strength which, as
Bosniak argues, legitimizes the progressive content ofcitizenship. In doing this,
it flows into the international arena through nationality. As international law
becomes more flexible in its use of nationality, so too it becomes part of
citizenship's progressive project. While this may lead to less certainty in the
resolution of disputes between nations, it will lead to more appropriate, just
outcomes in individual cases. This puts it more in line with a rights-based,
individualized focus for international law, rather than a sovereignty-based one.
121. See Bosniak, supra note 1, at 479-88.
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This is where the progressive citizenship project meets nationality, melding,
strengthening, and integrating them as one and the same tool for building justice
in a new era.
